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Abstract – The objective of this panel was to discuss issues related to the development and use of autonomous 
systems, with specific focus on the overriding themes of ethical considerations and potential liability for Human 
Factors and Ergonomics (HF/E) professionals who are involved in their development. Chris Brill provided opening 
remarks to frame the discussion and introduce the panelists. James Bliss discussed legal implications related to our 
collective penchant for developing conservative, false-alarm prone automation. Peter Hancock advocated for 
human-centered constraints on autonomous systems, as they may, one day, pose an existential threat to humanity. 
Dietrich Manzey discussed ethical considerations for autonomous systems, including how design can encourage 
ethical user behavior. Joachim Meyer argued that HF/E professionals have an obligation to help designers 
understand the ethical implications of poor design, particularly in the context of autonomous systems. Lastly, Alison 
Vredenburgh provided thoughts on potential liability for HF/E professionals, particularly in light of the relative 
newness of autonomous systems. The panel then turned to facilitated discussion with panelists and audience 
members. Specific themes included the boundaries of our responsibilities as HF/E professionals for ill-conceived or 
morally-objectionable systems, potential implications of manipulating user trust through design, cross-cultural 
perspectives on public acceptance and legal peril, and how concerns might differ by domain (e.g., medical vs. 
combat vs. manufacturing). The session concluded with panelists summarizing how ethics influence design and 
recommendations for how HF/E professionals can potentially protect themselves from legal liability for mishaps 
involving autonomous systems they helped develop. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A Nearly-Blind Sprint into the Brave World of 
Autonomous Systems 
J. Christopher Brill, Panel Organizer 
Old Dominion University 
 
This inspiration for this discussion panel proposal 
stemmed from recent articles on autonomous systems dealing 
with potential concerns regarding safety, ethics, and legal 
liability.  Numerous articles have been published on 
autonomous driving systems, one of which details a team's 
2994 mile drive from Los Angeles to New York City in less 
than 59 hours (including charging time) using Tesla's semi-
autonomous "autopilot" feature (Davies, 2015).  Automation 
was engaged 96% of the time and included segments driven at 
speeds approaching 90 miles per hour.  The author questions 
whether users should even be capable of activating autopilot at 
such high speeds.  As HF/E professionals, we advocate for the 
user experience and system flexibility, but we also understand 
the value and necessity of constraining actions - particularly 
when safety is concerned.  Indeed, system designers do their 
employers a disservice by not reining in reasonably 
foreseeable unsafe user behavior, thereby, leaving companies 
open to litigation. 
Conversely, Google's experimental self-driving cars may 
have the opposite problem - too many constraints on the user, 
as the most recent design lacks user-accessible controls (i.e., 
steering wheel, brake and acceleration pedals; Prynn, 2014).  
Proponents of the system claim this omission eliminates 
human users as a dangerous source of unpredictability in the 
system (Lavrinc, 2014).  By design, users cannot assume 
manual control in the event of automation failures.  Some may 
find this disturbing; during a 14-month test period, Google's 
engineers had to reclaim manual control of experimental test 
vehicles (in versions of the car that had manual controls) 341 
times (Davies, 2014).  Although most instances were due to 
mechanical failure, 20% occurred due to poor judgment or 
decision-making on the part of the automation.  
Notwithstanding, even if an autonomous vehicle has manual 
controls, passengers may be poorly poised to assume control.  
Their attention may be otherwise occupied by smart phone 
usage, or they may have been lulled into an altered conscious 
state by the car's motion through a natural vestibular response, 
called sopite syndrome (Graybiel & Knepton, 1976; Lawson 
& Mead, 1998).  Indeed, the very role of "passive passenger" 
makes sopite syndrome's assertion all the more likely, leading 
to sleepiness despite receiving and adequate night's rest, 
disinclination to stay on task, fuzzy-headedness, and general 
malaise - all of which could contribute to increased 
automation complacency and reliance. 
Another article questions whether developers of 
autonomous weapons systems can be prosecuted for war 
crimes (Majumdar, 2014).  The issue of autonomous weapons 
is an ethical maelstrom, with proponents and vocal opponents.  
The question of war crime prosecution is an interesting one, 
and it's a very safe bet that the first major mishap involving 
unintended civilian deaths by an autonomous weapons system 
will result in extensive inquiry to determine its cause.  HF/E 
professionals who were part of the development team will 
need to account for their roles and inputs (or lack thereof) into 
its design, as the system and its full history will be stripped 
C
op
yr
ig
ht
 2
01
6 
by
 H
um
an
 F
ac
to
rs
 a
nd
 E
rg
on
om
ic
s 
So
ci
et
y.
 D
O
I 1
0.
11
77
/1
54
19
31
21
36
01
07
0
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 2016 Annual Meeting 308
back and examined, screw-by-screw, from proverbial smoking 
barrel to system inception.  Although the end user (e.g., 
operator or commander on battleground) is at the sharp end of 
the stick, latent factors will likewise receive scrutiny.  A wise 
HF/E professional will need to surefooted on his or her role in 
system development.  For this type of situation, 
documentation of scientifically-sound design 
recommendations, data, and written evidence of any safety or 
performance concerns will likely provide the best defense.  
Autonomous medical systems (virtual doctors), farming 
systems, commercial shipping, and legal services will also be 
available in the near future (Al-Khatib, 2016), demonstrating 
near-term ubiquity.  Notwithstanding, there remains a 
significant, ongoing need for HF/E professionals.  We must be 
open to their benefits and apply scientific principles to 
facilitate the best possible performance, while engendering an 
appropriate level of user trust.  Likewise, we must sound the 
alarm when system trust is disproportionate or unwarranted.  
Perhaps most importantly, we must also serve as a conscience 
for the technology development community, for we 
understand the perils of poorly implemented or ill-considered 
design.  Dr. Ian Malcolm, of the movie Jurassic Park, may 
have captured this sentiment best: "... your scientists were so 
preoccupied with whether or not they could that they didn't 
stop to think whether they should."  If we decide we should 
(develop a particular autonomous system), then it is our 
responsibility to employ our scientific prowess to mold and 
nurture it, and when necessary, constrain or oppose it. 
 
J. Christopher Brill, Ph.D., is a Senior Research Psychologist 
and Team Lead for the Human Insight and Trust Team at the 
Air Force Research Laboratory.  He previously held faculty 
positions at Old Dominion University and Michigan Tech.  
His research focuses on human-system trust, multimodal 
displays, and human performance assessment.  The present 
work was submitted for publication prior to his employment 
with the U.S. government; the views and opinions contained 
herein are those of the author and should not be construed as 
an official U.S. government position, policy, or decision. 
 
Automation and Products Liability: Implications for 
System Trust and Litigation 
James P. Bliss 
Old Dominion University 
 
Researchers and task designers have become very 
interested in the impact of increasing automation on trust.  
Clearly, reduced levels of operator trust can degrade ongoing 
and future task performance, as demonstrated by many 
researchers (Breznitz, 1984; Getty, Swets, Pickett, & 
Gonthier, 1985).  Performance effects have included slowed 
reaction time and impaired accuracy.  Though such results 
may occur partly because of loss of situation awareness or 
changes in cognitive workload, many researchers have 
isolated trust as a vulnerable construct, especially when 
automation is clumsy (Weiner, 1989). 
Legal decisions have for many years impacted the use of 
automated sensor based warning systems.  Embracing a 
“better safe than sorry” approach, designers have often 
approached the creation and implementation of automated 
systems from the perspective of a duty to warn.  As a result, 
many modern systems present users with excessive warning 
signals, even when the statistical chance of a true problem is 
low.  One salient example is the low tire pressure warning 
system in automobiles.  Common criticisms of the system 
include false alarms due to outside temperature (Crowell, 
2015), damage from tire-mounting machines (Allen, 2009), or 
sensor batteries that have failed (Carley, 2015). 
As the domain of environments for automated systems 
becomes more diversified, the frequency and consequences of 
automation failure will rise.  Because automated systems are 
designed, fielded products, the potential for personal injury, 
and associated legal challenge, exists.  As human factors 
researchers make recommendations to improve the design and 
implementation of automated systems, careful consideration of 
the legal ramifications of automation failure is warranted.  
This presentation will focus on three of the significant 
concepts of products liability law:  strict liability, negligence, 
and breach of warranty.  Each will be discussed as they pertain 
to modern automated systems. 
 
James P. Bliss, Ph.D., joined the Psychology Department at 
Old Dominion University as an Associate Professor in 2001.  
He was awarded tenure in 2004, and is currently the 
department chair.  He and his students conduct research in two 
primary areas.  One is the occurrence of alarm (and 
automation) mistrust.  Specifically, he is interested in what 
factors contribute to the development of mistrust, and how 
designers and trainers can optimize compliance to automated 
systems.  The second broad area includes the use of virtual 
environments for task training.  Dr. Bliss and his students have 
worked with a number of research institutions, including 
Boeing, DARPA, the Office of Scientific Development, the 
US Army, and NASA, and AFOSR.  Dr. Bliss has also served 
as an expert witness in a number of product liability cases 
involving warnings and alarms. 
 
Designing Limits to Autonomous Systems 
Peter A. Hancock 
University of Central Florida 
 
We are witnessing an approaching sea-change in the way 
that advanced technological systems operate. Embedded in 
this line of evolution of our current automation there is a 
growing wave of ever-more independent, autonomous 
systems. The degree of interaction between such autonomy 
with any human operator is becoming progressively 
diminished. With this decreasing interaction comes decreasing 
system control on behalf of any human agency. In this 
presentation, I will advocate for human-centered constraints to 
be designed, programmed, promulgated and imposed upon 
these nascent forms of independent entity. It is important in 
the beginning to define the relevant terms. Here, I define 
automation as:  ‘those systems designed to accomplish a 
specific set of largely deterministic steps, most often in a 
repeating pattern, in order to achieve one of an envisaged and 
limited set of pre-defined outcomes.’ In apparent contrast, and 
I emphasize the word apparent here, I define autonomous 
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systems as: ‘those systems which are generative and learn, 
evolve and permanently change their functional capacities as 
a result of the input of operational and contextual information. 
Their actions necessarily become more indeterminate across 
time’ (see Hancock, 2016). What is very clear from the vector 
of our present progress is that that nascent growth of 
autonomy is necessarily predicated upon increasing levels of 
automation. In consequence, the two terms are certainly not in 
any form of contrast or mutual contradiction.  Rather, they 
represent differing serial stages of computational evolution. 
Like the evolutionary rates of all species, some facets of 
automation will rapidly change into autonomy. In other 
contexts simple automation will continue to suffice for the 
required task at hand. In these later cases, little impetus will 
drive such a specific system to any higher level of complexity 
and/or autonomy. The landscape of our own natural world 
provides a facile analog of this overall mimetic, inter-species 
existence. As the only fundamental difference between the 
conceptions of Lamarck and Darwin lie in the passage of time, 
the fact that technological evolution most closely 
approximates Lamarck’s vision does not mean species 
evolutionary principles are inapplicable in this latter case of 
these human fabricated technological systems. They simply 
change more quickly and, putatively, in more purposive and 
logical sequences. Since their actions necessarily become 
more opaque across time as their computational capacities 
increase we must ask crucial questions now about trust, 
reliability, and determinacy of action. This requires that we set 
design boundaries and constraints as these technologies 
evolve. Since their rate of evolution will outstrip our own by 
many orders of magnitude, the time to enact those design 
constraints is now. The fact that such design constraints will 
not be is simply another expression of the vacuity of the 
human species; a vacuity evident in its everyday individual 
and collective actions.  
Ergonomics and Human Factors are disciplines which are 
purpose-directed to mediate between human beings and the 
machines they create. For most of their existence, tools and 
their later expression in more advanced technologies have 
served to render human visions into material form in order, 
nominally, to facilitate individual and collective well-being. 
That the genesis of such technology and much of its associated 
progress has derived from the conflictive nature of the human 
character remains problematic. Humans and their propensity 
toward individual and small group optimization are often in 
conflict with the goals and aspirations of the putative ‘other’ 
(broadly defined) and this has proved to be no great cause for 
celebration. The wars with these others, whether our distant 
kin, other living things, and now the very environment that 
sustains us have seen great expansions of such material 
visions. Yet today many of these advances stand in direct 
opposition to, and threaten the continued existence of, our 
whole species. Now the very technological vehicles of 
‘progress’ are providing fundamental, profound and even 
existential threats. Whether technical solutions are necessarily 
required for perceived technical problems represents the 
quandary of our times. Here, I vacillate between the cheap, 
tawdry aspirations of delusional optimism and the vast, dark 
reality of rational pessimism. Please come and experience my 
personal, classical clasticism.  
 
Peter A. Hancock, D.Sc., Ph.D. is Provost Distinguished 
Research Professor in the Department of Psychology and the 
Institute for Simulation and Training, as well as at the 
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and the 
Department of Industrial Engineering and Management 
Systems at the University of Central Florida (UCF).  He 
directs the MIT2 Research Laboratories and Associate Director 
of the Center for Applied Human Factors in Aviation 
(CAHFA).  Professor Hancock is the author of over seven 
hundred refereed scientific articles and publications, as well as 
writing and editing fifteen books.  He has been continuously 
funded by extramural sources for every one of the thirty-one 
years of his professional career.  To date, he has secured over 
$17 Million in externally-funded research during his career. 
 
Ethics, accountability for (mis-)use of automated systems 
and the issue of automation surprise 
Dietrich Manzey 
Berlin Institute of Technology 
 
In my contribution, I will address three aspects which I 
consider important issues with respect to ethics of design of 
automated and/or autonomous systems. 
First, what is the ethical basis for decisions to become 
involved in some technology development, and what does that 
mean for the individual accountability? This sort of ethical 
issue involves ethical considerations and decisions on a 
societal as well as individual level. In democratic societies, the 
first level usually involves what I would term informed 
(political) discussions about general aspects of technology use.  
A recent example is the decision in Germany to step out of the 
nuclear power program, based on considerations about the 
limits of controllability and risks involved in this sort of 
technology. Typically such discussions results guidelines 
(laws, regulations) about what technology is acceptable and 
what not. However, does this release from any ethical 
considerations and accountability of becoming involved in 
technology development which is considered as acceptable? 
No, certainly not. The mere fact that a society accepts certain 
technologies and systems does not release an individual 
designer or manufacturer to decide about becoming involved. 
This always involves personal considerations of ethics and 
morals, which then lead to an individual decision to become 
involved or not. In case of a positive decision, this also 
includes to take the responsibility and accountability for the 
consequences of use of the technology. For example, if you 
decide to become involved as human factors engineer in the 
design of technology or interfaces of systems that might harm 
persons, you inevitably also share accountability for the use of 
these systems and the consequences. This holds true although 
you might have been involved only as a scientist. The 
paradigmatic historical example is that of the (German) 
scientist involved in the atomic bomb program first in 
Germany and later in the US. 
Secondly, as we know from our human factors research, 
there are several issues in human-automation interaction that 
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relate to incidents of overtrust or, more general, misuse of 
automation. Most discussed examples involve complacency 
and automation bias (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). What 
does that mean for the ethics of automation design and the 
accountability of engineers and human factors experts 
involved in the design of these systems? I will argue that all of 
our concepts of human-centered system design might provide 
a sort of ethical guideline for most of these issues. However, 
there might also emerge specific ethical issues related to the 
use of automated systems which go beyond this and which 
need to be carefully to be considered by designers in addition 
to the basic principles of human-centered design. For example, 
Cummings (2006) has discussed the issue of interfaces to 
serve as moral buffer for human actions which particularly 
represent an (ethical) issue when developing interfaces of 
systems to be used in the military or medical domain that can 
harm people. 
Thirdly, complex automated systems like currently used 
in aviation but also other domain has repeatedly shown to 
provide what has been referred to as automation surprises 
(Sarter et al., 1997). Often these “surprises” result from 
situations and complex constellations which, in principle, do 
not seem to be anticipatable or avoidable by neither the 
manufacturer of the system, nor the user. They directly 
correspond to what has been referred to as normal accidents 
by Perrow (1999). From my point of view, this raises a 
complex ethical issue of responsibility and accountability 
which is difficult to resolve. Take, for example, an accident 
occurring with a state-of-the art airplane manufactured 
according to the highest engineering and human factors 
standard, operated by highly trained pilots of a major airline 
with highest safety standards. Who is accountable or liable for 
the accident? The pilot? The manufacturer? The airline? Any 
others? I will argue that, similar to the discussion around 
normal accidents, any questions of individual accountability or 
liability are misaddressed in this case. Ethically, we probably 
have to live with such instances and their consequences if we, 
as society or humanity, decide to introduce and use this sort of 
technology. If at all, the society might be taken accountable 
for the consequences resulting from this decision. 
 
Dietrich Manzey, Ph.D,. is a university professor of work, 
engineering, and organizational psychology at Technical 
University of Berlin (TU Berlin), Germany.  He received his 
Ph.D. in experimental psychology at the University of Kiel, 
Germany, in 1988.  Among others, his research interests 
include issues of human-automation interaction, system safety 
in high-hazard industries, and multitasking and human 
performance in extreme environments. 
 
Doing Good with Good Human Factors 
Joachim Meyer 
Tel Aviv University 
 
The design of the user side of technologies, the focus on 
users’ interactions with systems, and the need to define users’ 
role in advanced systems inherently touch on ethical issues. 
Some of these issues are classic ethical dilemmas. Do we 
design the system so that the overall utility from using the 
system will be maximal (as prescribed by an utilitarian 
position, proposed by Bentham, Mill, and more recently, 
Harsany) or should we design the system so that the weakest, 
least advantaged user can benefit from it (a Rawlsian 
approach)? When we design a system, should we focus on the 
users’ interests or should we prefer the interests of the 
organization that hired us? Should we, as a profession, define 
the limits of ethically sound applications of human factors, or 
should we leave it to the individual practitioners to decide 
what is acceptable for them? 
Here, as in any other case when one faces ethical 
dilemmas, it is impossible to provide definite, universally 
accepted guidelines. However, I argue that it is the duty of the 
human factors professional to contribute to the discussions of 
ethical points. The application of sound human factors 
knowledge can be valuable input and can often serve as a 
“sanity check” for decisions regarding ethical issues.  
To provide the needed input for the discussions, the 
profession must have tools to provide clear predictions of 
human behavior and system performance, given certain 
decisions. We should be able to predict that if one decides to 
automate function X, there will be a Y% chance of a 
malfunction, which can lead to some negative consequence (N 
people will be hurt). If one chooses not to automate the 
function, there will be some probability for a malfunction too, 
and either more or fewer people will be hurt. The decision 
whether these are acceptable values, given the costs and 
investments needed for the different alternatives, will probably 
be made by others. However, we should be the ones to provide 
the input for these decisions. 
At times we can rule out certain decisions. For instance, if 
an operator is expected to monitor a system passively for 
hundreds of hours in order to intervene within seconds when a 
malfunction occurs, we can safely say that this operator is 
doomed to fail. Such a statement may not be aligned with the 
preferences of the legal advisors of the organizations. They 
may prefer to blame the specific operator for problems of the 
system, rather than the system owner or designer. However, 
our knowledge and expertise can help prevent such bad 
designs. If such a design is still implemented (perhaps because 
no human factors professional was involved in the design 
process), we should be able to inform whoever investigates 
incidents what was and was not likely to happen, given the 
situation and the characteristics of the system and the user. 
This is already widely done in the context of traffic safety and 
forensic human factors, but we still haven’t gotten very far in 
the context of automation. 
Thus, I would argue that the role of human factors 
professionals and cognitive engineers is to present the 
implications of design and operations decisions. The decisions 
will eventually then be made by others, but ideally the input 
should have some importance. To face up to this task, we have 
to generate sound knowledge and validated models to predict 
the consequences of design and operations decisions. Without 
them our recommendations will carry little weight, and we 
may even at times cause damage. 
 
Joachim Meyer, Ph.D., is a professor in the Department of 
Industrial Engineering at Tel Aviv University.  He is the 
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 2016 Annual Meeting 311
current department chair and the founder of the Interacting 
with Technology (IwiT) laboratory.  During the 2014-15 
academic year, he was on sabbatical in Boston, where he 
served as a visiting professor with the Human Dynamics 
Group at the MIT MediaLab.  He holds an M.A. in 
Psychology and a Ph.D. in Industrial Engineering from Ben-
Gurion University.  He is an associate editor for IEEE 
Transactions on Human Machine Systems and for the Journal 
of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making and is on the 
editorial board of Human Factors.  His primary areas of 
research include decision aids and warning systems, 
interaction with adaptive automation, human-robotic 
interaction, and medical decision-making. 
 
Forensics Considerations Regarding Autonomous Systems 
Alison Vredenburgh 
Vredenburgh & Associates, Inc. 
 
Human factors professionals who provide a forensic 
analysis of products consider how manufacturers manage 
hazards. This evaluation is through the lens of the hazard 
management and control hierarchy that addresses risk 
management through design, barriers/guarding, and warnings 
and risk communication systems. When analyzing a product, 
an important consideration is its foreseeable uses and misuses. 
This means that products need to be evaluated by testing the 
range of potential user populations in the expected use 
environments. Part of determining potential misuses is to 
consider transfer of training from older technologies to 
autonomous systems; a negative transfer would occur when 
new systems require user responses inconsistent with prior 
learned behavior (Vredenburgh & Zackowitz, 2006). 
User expectations are a key factor in risk perception and 
thus whether users read and comply with safety information. 
Warning effectiveness tends to increase as a function of 
perceived hazardless; if autonomous products appear to be 
safer, users may take fewer self-protective measures 
(Vredenburgh & Zackowitz, 2006). Therefore, strongly 
worded warnings may be needed to override these perceptions. 
Moreover, it is important to consider that marketing materials 
and advertising for these new technologies may act as anti-
warnings; media that represent dangerous products as safer 
can contradict or undermine warnings (Bohme & Egilman, 
2006). Anti-warnings may make new technologies appear to 
eliminate or reduce the need for monitoring and safe behavior 
by the users. 
Autonomous systems are a reasonably new technology; 
thus expectations based on prior experience with older 
technologies of similar products and safety perceptions about 
this new market segment would be key factors for 
consideration in a forensic evaluation. 
 
Alison Vredenburgh, Ph.D., is the principal of Vredenburgh 
& Associates, Inc.  She has published more than eighty peer-
reviewed papers in the areas of human factors, safety, and 
psychology.  She has served as an expert witness for hundreds 
of personal injury and products liability cases and has testified 
in Municipal, Superior, and Federal District Courts.  She has 
held several offices within HFES and is the current Program 
Chair of the Forensics Professional Group.  She holds a Ph.D. 
in Industrial-Organizational Psychology and is a Certified 
Professional Ergonomist (CPE). 
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